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Montana's Adoption of the Federal
Definition of Income*
By GEORGE T. BENNETTI
INTRODUCTION
The Thirty-fourth Session of the Montana Legislature, by Chapter 260,
Laws of 1955, hitched the Montana income tax wagon to one of the most
complex revenue laws in the world, the federal income tax law as con-
tained in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Chapter 260 became effective as to all taxable years ending after June
30, 1955. We thus have a history of approximately five taxable years under
the Montana act with its incorporation of federal income tax provisions.
During these five years many problems have arisen under Chapter 260 for
taxpayers and tax collectors alike, and it is evident that confusion has been
created.
Clearly it was the intent of the Legislature to adopt the federal defini-
tion of income, but since there are several, the question arises as to which
definition Montana intended to adopt and in what manner? The Legisla-
ture also expressed an intent to simplify the preparation and filing of state
returns and to ease the task of the State Income Tax Department in audit-
ing and correcting returns; but has this been the result?
The following discussion illustrates some of the problems, some of the
changes, and some of the weaknesses existing in the Montana income tax
law brought about and caused by Chapter 260. While many of the prob-
lems are more apparent than real, there are areas in which hazards exist
for both the taxpayer and the tax collector. If nothing else, this discussion
will serve as a "red flag" in this area for the tax practitioner and inter-
ested taxpayers.
WHAT DEFINITION OF INCOME WAS ADOPTED FROM
THE FEDERAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE?
Prior to the amendment of the Montana income tax law by Chapter 260,
in the computation of income tax liability the taxpayer was concerned with
two concepts, to-wit: gross income and net income. On the other hand,
under the federal Internal Revenue Code the taxpayer was concerned with
three concepts or definitions of income: gross income, adjusted gross in-
come, and taxable income.
After the amendment of the Montana statute in 1955, the Montana
taxpayer had three concepts of income to deal with: gross income, ad-
justed gross income, and net income. For 1960, and by reason of Chapters
253 and 265, Laws of 1959, the Montana taxpayer has yet another term to
deal with, and that is taxable income, which is defined by section 84-
4901,(11) as gross income less the deductions and exemptions allowed by
the act in question.
*An address by Mr. Bennett before the 1960 Montana State University Institute on
Taxation and Estate Planning.
tMember of the Montana Bar. B.B.A. 1951, M.B.A. 1957, LL.B. 1957, University of
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It should be noted that since its inception in 1933, the Montana income
tax has been levied against net income. Thus, in 1960, the tax was levied
against taxable income for the first time.
Adjusted Gross Income
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, section 84-4905 now defines adjusted
gross income as being adjusted gross income as defined in section 62 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or as that section may be labeled or
amended, with the addition of interest on state, county and municipal bonds
(a type of income which had been excluded from the federal definition of
gross income by section 103), and excludes interest on United States ob-
ligations and dividends on national bank stock when the bank has a situs
in Montana. In this connection it should be noted that interest on United
States obligations and dividends paid on national bank stocks would be ex-
cluded from net income by reason of section 84-4932, even if section 84-4905
made no such provision.
As you know, the concept of adjusted gross income, with a few excep-
tions, is gross income less expenses incurred in business and profit-seeking
activities, and was developed in 1944 in connection with the allowance of
the so-called standard deduction in the federal income tax law.
Section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code does not create new deduc-
tions in computing adjusted gross income, but simply allows the deductions
already set out in the income tax portion of the Internal Revenue Code.
Under neither the federal nor the Montana law is the tax levied against
adjusted gross income. Under the federal law, the tax is levied against
taxable income; under the Montana statute for years prior to 1960, it is
levied against net income, but for the year 1960 and for subsequent years,
it is levied against taxable income as defined in the Montana statute.
The concept of adjusted gross income is important only in computing
the standard deduction, in calculating the maximum amount allowable for
charitable contributions, and in computing the minimum floor for medical
expenses which can be deducted if the standard deduction is not taken.
Section 84-4906 does not use or refer to adjusted gross in computing
net income.
By section 84-4908, enacted by Chapter 260, Laws of 1955, a standard
deduction was allowed for the first time in the Montana statute, but it is
allowed only to "a resident individual" as the term "resident" is defined
in section 84-4901(6). The standard deduction under Montana law and
federal law is 10% of adjusted gross income. However, unlike the federal
act after the technical amendments of 1948, the upper limit under the
Montana law is $500.00, except that in the case of a joint return of husband
and wife the upper limit is $1,000.
The standard deduction under section 84-4908 is allowed in lieu of
the deductions provided for in section 84-4906. However, section 84-4906
allows not only the so-called personal expenses of section 211, Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, but also the business expenses referred to in section
161, and this seems to indicate that the Montana Legislature was somewhat
confused as to the real nature of the standard deduction and the concept of
adjusted gross income.
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Also, since the standard deduction is in lieu of the deductions allowed
by section 84-4906, it would in any event be in lieu of the deduction for
federal income tax paid. Since the federal tax, except in rare instances,
is more than 10% of adjusted gross income (or $500.00) for a given tax-
payer, the standard deduction will rarely be used, leaving the concept of
adjusted gross income important only in connection with the deduction
for medical expenses and charitable contributions.
Thus, although the Legislature adopted the federal definition of ad-
justed gross income, this definition has only limited application under Mon-
tana law.
Net Income - Taxable Income
Since the tax is levied against net income by section 84-4902 and
against taxable income by that section for 1960 and following years, it is
this definition which plays the most important part in the tax computation.
Net income is defined by section 84-4901(10) as gross income, less the
deduction allowed by the statute.
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, section 84-4906 states that in comput-
ing net income there shall be allowed as deductions the items referred to
in sections 161 and 211 of the Internal Revenue Code, plus federal income
tax paid within the taxable year. Thus, it would appear that the deduction
for long-term capital gains allowed by section 1202, while clearly allowed
in computing adjusted gross income, is not incorporated in section 84-4906.
However, as a practical matter the Income Tax Department has allowed
this deduction.
Gross Income
Prior to the adoption of Chapter 260, the Montana income tax statute
contained in section 84-4907 a definition of gross income. This section
provided that such items were to be included in gross income for the taxable
year in which received by the taxpayer, unless under the methods of ac-
counting permitted in the act the amounts were to be properly accounted
for in a different period. Section 84-4907 also excluded certain items from
gross income.
Section 84-4933 of the old law set forth the method for computing gain
or loss upon sales or disposition of property. Section 84-4934 specified that
the gain or loss on sales or exchanges of property was to be recognized,
except in the instances set forth in that section.
Section 84-4935 of the pre-1955 Montana law provided that where gain
or loss was not recognized upon sales or exchanges of property, the proper-
ty received in such sale or exchange was to be treated as taking the place
of the property given up.
All of these provisions were repealed or amended by Chapter 260
and no replacement provisions were enacted, nor is there in the Montana
statute at present any specific reference to any provisions in the Internal
Revenue Code which define gross income, prescribe the methods for com-
puting gain or loss on sales or exchanges of property, prescribe when such
gain or loss is to be recognized, or prescribe how and when items of in-
come are to be accounted for. In short, the whole question of what con-
stitutes gross income and how and when it is to be reported and accounted
for has been completely omitted from the present Montana act, except to the
1961]
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extent that the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code can be said to have
been incorporated.
As you know, no one provision in the Internal Revenue Code attempts
to define gross income. Section 61 contains a very general definition of
gross income, but specifically states that this definition is not all-inclusive
and is subject to the other provisions of Sub-Title A, which, of course, is
the entire federal income tax law.
Sections 71 through 77 of the Internal Revenue Code specifically in-
clude certain items in gross income. Sections 101 through 119 specifically
exclude certain items from gross income. Even these sections, however, do
not give us the true definition of gross income as respects a given taxpayer
for a given taxable period. What constitutes gross income for a taxpayer
depends to some degree upon elections made by that taxpayer.
Under the Internal Revenue Code a taxpayer's gross income for a
given period may be affected by such elections as the following:
(1) Fiscal year or calendar year reporting under section 441.
(2) Cash or accrual accounting under section 446.
(3) Installment method of reporting income under section 453.
(4) Discharge of indebtedness excluded from gross income under sec-
tion 108 with comparable adjustment in basis of certain proper-
ties under section 1017.
(5) Carrying charges charged to capital account with respect to prop-
erty, upon election of taxpayer under section 266.
(6) The income with respect to obligations issued at discount may be
reported as the taxpayer elects under section 454.
(7) Recognition of gain may be "postponed" under certain so-called
non-recognition provisions such as sections 1031, 1032, 1033, 1034.
(8) Upon election of the shareholders of the so-called "Sub-Chapter
S, small business corporation" the tax upon the corporation's
undistributed taxable income (or loss) may be shifted from the
corporate level to the individual level, pursuant to sections 1371-
1377.
The above are some examples of the elective provisions which will af-
fect gross income and do not represent an attempt at an exhaustive list.
However, the foregoing provisions raise several questions concerning the
Montana concept of income. First, as noted previously, the Montana statute
does not contain a definition of gross income, nor any provisions dealing
with the methods of accounting for or reporting such income. One may ask
whether the Montana Legislature has attempted, by Chapter 260, Laws of
1955, to incorporate in the Montana law the federal definition of gross in-
come as contained in the Internal Revenue Codes of 1954 (or as that act
may be amended) and if so, how is this definition affected by the various
elections or choices allowed to the taxpayer as to the reporting of income?
There is a theory held by many that the Legislature intended that the
adjusted gross income reported for Montana purposes be the same as the
adjusted gross income reported for federal purposes, subject only to the
exceptions specifically set forth in the Montana statute. These exceptions,
of course, relate to items which are not taxable under the federal statute,
[Vol. 23,
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but taxable under the Montana statute and vice versa, and items of in-
come not from Montana sources received by nonresidents. Under this theory
elections made by the taxpayer for federal purposes would be automatically
binding for state purposes.
It would seem, however, that the Montana Legislature, had it intended
this result, could simply have stated by Chapter 260, Laws of 1955, that
adjusted gross income for Montana purposes was to be the adjusted gross
income reported by the taxpayer in the return filed for federal purposes,
subject to the exceptions specifically set forth in the Montana statute. That
the Legislature did not do this is abundantly clear.
The Legislature deleted from the old Montana statute references to
gross income, methods of accounting for income, methods for computing
gain or loss, and the time for recognition or non-recognition of such gain
or loss. It would not seem that the Legislature would leave the statute
completely without such essential provisions or definitions. The Legisla-
ture was well aware of the many provisions in the Internal Revenue Code
which affect the definition of gross income. Therefore, it is this writer's
opinion that the Legislature adopted by reference, and by incorporation,
in the Montana statute, all of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
which deal with taxpayers subject to the Montana statute and relating to
gross income, and the method of reporting and accounting for such income,
including the installment sale provisions and the non-recognition provisions.
However, it also appears that the Legislature left to the individual taxpay-
er all of the elections contained within the Internal Revenue Code, subject
to regulations which are within the province of the State Board of Equaliza-
tion and not in conflict with the law and intent of the Legislature. The
taxpayer thus may make all of the elections allowed to him under the fed-
eral code for Montana purposes, and is not bound to make the same elec-
tions for state and federal purposes.
MAJOR CHANGES EFFECTED BY CHAPTER 260
It is important to note here some of the major changes brought about
by the incorporation of federal definitions of income.
Capital Gains and Losses
Under the old Montana statute no distinction was drawn between cap-
ital gains and losses and ordinary gains and losses, and there was in the
old statute no definition of a capital asset. Under the present Montana
statute the taxpayer is allowed the capital gains deduction which for the
most part eliminates one-half of that gain from taxable income. Capital
losses, on the other hand, cannot be taken in full as they were under the
old Montana act but are limited to gains, plus a thousand dollars, and the
further allowance of capital loss carryover. The resulting annual revenue
loss was estimated by the Department at roughly $250,000 by reason of
the allowance of the deduction against capital gains.
In determining what constitutes a capital gain or loss, reference must
be made to the Internal Revenue Code as applicable to the Montana taxpay-
er, and this reference would appear to include section 1231.
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Installment Sales
The federal provisions dealing with installment sales enlarged upon
the scope of the provisions of the Montana statute prior to Chapter 260.
Section 84-4906(e), as contained in the old statute, allowed the taxpayer
who "regularly sells or otherwise disposes of personal property or makes
casual sales of real estate where not more than 30% is reported in the year
of-the sale" to report on the installment method. The limitation of the
installment method to regular sales of personal property (essentially deal-
ers) seems to have been a legislative oversight which caused a serious tax
trap for many taxpayers who used this method for federal purposes and
assumed that they could use the same method for state purposes.
Loss Carry-over and/or Carried Back
Prior to Chapter 260, losses were required to be taken entirely in the
year in which they occurred or accrued. Under present Montana law, net
operating losses may be carried back and carried forward. Tlhis is also true
under the federal law.
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 172, was amended in 1958.
Prior to this amendment loss carrybacks were for two years rather than
for the present three years. In applying section 172 the State Board of
Equalization early ruled that it had no application to the years prior to
the effective date of Chapter 260. Thus, losses prior to that date could
not be carried forward and losses after that date could not be carried back
to years before the effective date for the purposes of reducing tax, but
were required to be carried back and exhausted before being carried for-
ward.
Also, in connection with net operating losses, section 6511(d) (2) (a) pro-
vides a special rule for filing claims for refund or credit of tax where there
has been an overpayment attributable to a net operating loss carryback.
The effect of this provision is to extend the period of limitation with re-
spect to the filing of such claim. However, the Montana statute contains a
provision, section 84-4956, which provides provides that no credit or re-
fund shall be allowed or made after three years from the time the tax was
paid, unless before the expiration of such period a claim for refund or
credit is filed by the taxpayer. Since section 84-4956 contains no excep-
tion similar to that contained in section 6511(d) (2) of the Internal Revenue
Code, situations will arise where a taxpayer will be allowed a refund or
credit for federal purposes in connection with a loss carryback, but will be
prevented from obtaining a refund for state purposes by reason of section
84-4956. In this connection it should be noted that the same situation will
exist with regard to bad debts and worthless securities if a claim for refund
is based upon an overpayment of tax in connection therewith.
Capital losses for Montana purposes may also be carried forward as
provided in section 1212.
Final Return of a Decedent
Under section 84-4905 before the enactment of Chapter 260, Laws of
Montana, 1955, the final return of a decedent was required to be made on
an "inventory basis" regardless of the method previously used in account-
ing for income.
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Also, under section 84-4906(e) of the old statute, the State Board
ruled that upon the death of the owner of an installment obligation the
gain on the remaining balance was to be reported in the decedent's last
return.
After the effective date of Chapter 260, the inventory basis of com-
puting income on a decedent's last return, and the inclusion in such re-
turn of the remaining balance upon installment obligations, were no longer
required and those persons to whom the property was transmitted upon
death acquired the property with a date of death valuation as their basis.
The revenue loss to Montana was considerable by reason of these changes.
Depreciation
The old Montana statute had simply allowed a deduction for "ex-
haustion, wear and tear of property . . . [and] . . . for obsolescence."
There was no method prescribed for computing depreciation or obsolescence.
By the incorporation of the federal law all of the various methods of com-
puting depreciation are now available to the taxpayer, i.e., sum of the
years' digits, declining balance, as well as straight-line.
Annuity Payments
Under the old Montana statute, annuity or similar payments were
received tax-free until a taxpayer had recovered his cost or other basis,
and then the remaining payments were entirely taxable. Now the taxa-
bility of annuity payments must be computed under rather complicated
federal rules. In connection with profit-sharing and pension plans under
the old statute the employer was allowed a deduction for contributions and
the employee was taxed upon such contributions as compensation..
Also, it would seem that since the Montana Legislature intended to
adopt the federal definition of gross income, the various provisions dealing
with profit-sharing plans and deferred compensation must also be referred
to in determining what constitutes gross income under such deferred com-
pensation plans and also in determining when a deduction may be taken
for constributions to such plans.
Federal Income Taxes as a Deduction
Section 84-4903(3) of the old law allowed as a deduction in computing
net income certain specified taxes "paid or accrued within the taxable
year." Section 84-4906(b) now allows "federal income tax paid within
the taxable year" to be taken as a deduction. It should be noted that fed-
eral income tax accrued within the taxable year is not mentioned and, there-
fore, is not allowed as a deduction.
Because most, if not all, taxpayers are now required to estimate and
pay their taxes in advance or their taxes are withheld by their employers,
federal taxes are, by payment of estimate or withholding, being "paid"
during the current taxable year. Thus at the end of 1959, a taxpayer will
know how much federal income tax he has paid by way of withholding or
estimate. In computing his Montana tax the taxpayer will use the amount
of tax withheld or estimated and paid as the amount of his deduction for
federal tax whether this is his actual federal liability or not. If this
method were not used, the taxpayer would become involved with an alge-
braic formula similar to that used in computing the marital deduction for
1961)
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estate tax purposes. This is true because the federal tax is a deduction
in computing the state tax and the state tax is a deduction in computing
the federal, and before one tax is computed the other must be known.
If the taxpayer's actual federal tax liability is greater or less than the
amount which has been paid by withholding or estimate, then in the year
following the taxable year the taxpayer will pay more tax or be granted a
credit or refund. If a, taxpayer pays more tax he will be allowed a deduc-
tion for that taxable year for state purposes. If on the other hand, he is
granted a credit or refund this amount must be returned to income for Mon-
tana purposes and by reason of section 111 of the Internal Revenue Code,
which requires the return to gross income of amounts recovered in connec-
tion with a bad debt, prior tax, or delinquency amount, where there has
been a previous deduction and tax benefit. If no tax benefit was derived
from the deduction of the federal tax in the prior year, the federal refund
or credit would not be required to be included in Montana gross income.
The allowance of the federal income tax paid as a deduction for Mon-
tana tax purposes has some interesting ramifications and this problem will
be discussed later. However, one interesting aspect is that since the fed-
eral tax rates are higher and more progressive than the state, a single in-
dividual with $12,000 of taxable income pays less tax than a married tax-
payer with the same amount of taxable income and less than a married
individual with four dependents at the $24,000 taxable income level.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHAPTER 260
We should pause at this stage to consider a problem raised by Chapter
260, and that is the possibility that it is unconstitutional, or would be un-
constitutional in some of its application.
The problem in this area is that sections 84-4905 and 84-4906, by in-
corporating in the Montana law certain sections of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, or as those sections may be labeled or amended, has subjected
the law or the particular provisions in question, to the possible charge that
this constitutes an attempt to delegate legislative and judicial authority and
as such is unconstitutional.
Without elaboration, it is this writer's opinion that the Legislature can
and could very properly incorporate in the Montana act existing federal
law, i.e., the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code in effect on July 1,
1955. This is not the first time that the Legislature of this state has so
incorporated existing law. For example, the common law of England as
it existed at a certain date was incorporated by reference in our law where
it did not conflict with express provisions thereof. Also, where we have
adopted statutes from other states they are deemed to have been adopted
with the judicial interpretations of the courts of those states rendered prior
to adoption, and this is not subject to a charge of thereby usurping the
judicial function of our state courts or denying to such courts the right to
construe our laws.
A serious question is whether the Legislature could properly incor-
porate prospective legislation, i.e., changes in the Internal Revenue Code
after July 1, 1955. It appears that only where the Montana Income Tax
Department is seeking to apply a provision or provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code enacted by Congress after July 1, 1955, to a particular tax-
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payer, would the question of constitutionality be properly raised, and only
by that taxpayer, and only as to the application of prospective federal
changes to the computation of his tax liability.
In other words, the Montana statute is not, in my opinion, unconstitu-
tional in whole, and the only question which can be raised on constitutional
grounds is whether the Legislature could provide that prospective changes
in the federal law are automatically to become part of the Montana law.
There seem to be well reasoned authorities on both sides of the issue.
In the event our courts should hold that the statute is defective in
this respect, could not the State Income Tax Department raise a similar
question and attempt to deny to a taxpayer the use of a provision of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, enacted by Congress after 1955, which was
favorable to the taxpayer, on the ground that the Montana Legislature had
no power to incorporate future change in the federal law?
SUB-CHAPTER S, SMALL BUSINESS CORPORATION,
AND THE MONTANA INCOME TAX ACT
Many of the problems previously discussed can be illustrated in con-
nection with the problem of the Sub-Chapter S, small business corporation.
By Chapter 263, Laws of 1959, the Montana Legislature removed from
the deductions allowable in computing the corporation license tax the fed-
eral tax on corporate income, thus eliminating one of the major deductions
allowable in computing that tax. Thus, for the shareholders of a so-called
Sub-Chapter S, small business corporation, the election to have the cor-
poration's undistributed taxable income treated as if received and included
in the shareholders' income, and the tax paid at the individual rather than
the corporate level, would allow the individual shareholders to take a deduc-
tion for the tax under section 84-4906, where if the corporation had paid
the tax it would not have been an allowable deduction under the cor-
poration license tax.
However, some questions immediately come to mind in connection with
Sub-Chapter S and the shareholders' election. When the Montana Legis-
lature by Chapter 122, Laws of 1959, amended the corporation license tax
statute by adding sections 18-1501.1 and 84-1501.2 dealing with small busi-
ness corporations, it was expressly provided by section 84-1501.2(g) that
election to be so taxed was not effective unless the corporate net income or
loss of the electing corporation was included in the shareholders' adjusted
gross income as defined in section 84-4905. Thus, the election under the
corporation license tax law is clearly not effective unless the shareholders
include this corporate income or loss in their adjusted gross under the
Montana income tax law.
Of course, it could immediately be pointed out that section 84-1501.2 (g)
requires the inclusion of such corporate income or loss in adjusted gross,
but not in net income, and since adjusted gross has only limited use and
significance the net effect is that there is no specific requirement that the
shareholders pay a tax on this corporate income. However, section 1373
specifically requires that the undistributed taxable income of an electing
small business corporation shall be included in the gross income of the
shareholder.
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The second problem is that Sub-Chapter S, as contained in sections
1371 through 1377 of the Internal Revenue Code, having been enacted in
1958, were not a part of the Internal Revenue Code on July 1, 1955, when
the Legislature made Chapter 260 effective. Consequently, the attempt of
the Legislature to incorporate future or prospective changes in the Internal
Revenue Code is perhaps abortive as an unconstitutional delegation of leg-
islative authority. If this is true, Sub-Chapter S cannot be considered in
any way to be a part of the Montana income tax law.
Another problem is in connection with the shareholders of a qualifying
small business corporation, who desire to elect the special tax treatment ac-
corded by Sub-Chapter S for state purposes only and not for federal pur-
poses, or for federal purposes and not for state purposes.
For example, if the shareholders elect to use Sub-Chapter S for state
purposes only, and do not make the election with the federal taxing author-
ities, the undistributed corporate earnings or loss would not be included
in their adjusted gross incomes for federal purposes and under the theory
of those who say that adjusted gross income for federal purposes is and
must be adjusted gross income for state purposes, there could be no single
election.
On the other hand, suppose the shareholders elect to use Sub-Chapter
S for federal purposes and not for state purposes. In this case, if the share-
holders are allowed to elect in this manner, the corporate income or loss
would be included in the shareholders' gross incomes for federal purposes,
but not for state purposes. The shareholders would pay a federal tax but
not a state tax and apparently would be allowed a deduction under section
84-4906 for a federal tax paid upon income which was not taxable to the
State of Montana.
In the illustrations given above, we have assumed that the corporation
was subject to corporation license tax and that the shareholders were Mon-
tana residents. Where this is not the situation our problems are increased.
The corporation license tax is a tax upon the privilege of doing business in
Montana in the corporate form and is measured by income from Montana
sources only. Thus, there might be a corporation not doing business in
Montana and thus not subject to corporation license tax but which has
shareholders resident in this state. If the shareholders of such a corpora-
tion elect to be taxed under Sub-Chapter S for federal purposes they could
not in any event elect to be so taxed under the Montana corporation license
tax act for the reason that the corporation is not subject to that tax. But
may such a shareholder take a deduction for the federal tax paid by reason
of the inclusion of this corporate income in his gross income for federal
purposes? What about basis adjustments with respect to the shareholder's
stock ?
A similar problem is that of the nonresident shareholder of a small
business corporation. Let us assume for this purpose that the corporation
derives all of its income from Montana sources, and the shareholder is a
nonresident of the State of Montana. Under section 84-4907 nonresidents
are not (with one exception) required to include in income, dividends re-
ceived from corporations doing business in Montana. Even if the corpora-
tion should make an actual distribution by way of dividend, the distribution
would not be taxable to the nonresident except in situations not here
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relevant. Thus, Sub-Chapter S, if it has application, makes the undis-
tributed corporate income taxable to such nonresident, whereas had the
income actually been distributed it would not have been taxable. In other
words, if a nonresident is not taxable upon actual dividends, should he be
taxed upon undistributed taxable income of the corporation?
CONCLUSION
Many of the problems raised above suggest their own solution. If the
taxpayer refrains from taking extreme positions and the State Income Tax
Department exercises sound judgment and logic in administering the law,
perhaps many of the problems will disappear or, if they do not disappear,
then both the taxpayer and the tax collector can pretend they do not exist.
However, the careful lawyer, accountant, or tax practitioner will, if in
doubt, be well advised to obtain a ruling from the Income Tax Department
on his particular problem in advance of the filing of returns or prior to
the exercise of elections allowed for reporting or accounting for income.
ADDENDUM:
AUTHORITIES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
RAISED BY CHAPTER 260, LAWS OF MONTANA, 1955
Many of the cases dealing with the question of the right of the legis-
lature to incorporate by reference future or prospective federal legislation
are collected in 133 A.L.R. 403; 166 A.L.R. 518, and the supplement to the
last cited in 42 A.L.R. 2d 797.
Alaska has imposed an income tax which specifically incorporates by
reference the federal Internal Revenue Code, "as now in effect, or as here-
after amended" and the tax is a percentage of the tax paid to the federal
government, as contrasted to Montana adoption of federal definitions of in-
come with the Montana act retaining its own rate structure, exemptions,
and other essential provisions.
The Alaska act has been contested on these grounds and discussed by
Judge Pope in the case of the Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mullaney, 84 F.
Supp. 561, affd., 180 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1950).
See also Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S.C. 158, 115 S.E. 202 (1922);
Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930) ; Had v. McKen-
ney, 61 Ga. App. 552, 6 S.E.2d 405 (1939) ; First Federal Savings and Loan
Association v. Connelly, 142 Conn. 483, 115 A.2d 455 (1955); Tawes v.
Strouse, 182 Md. 508, 35 A.2d 233 (1943); In Re Lasswell, 1 Cal. App. 2d
183, 36 P.2d 678 (1934).
There is also an article by Mr. Tom Hendricks in 17 Mont. Law Review
203 (1956) entitled "Constitutional Questions Raised by Montana's New
Income Tax Law."
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